Disentangling factors behind training participation in Italy by Croce, Giuseppe & Tancioni, Massimiliano
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Roma, Ottobre 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper n.101 
 
Giuseppe Croce e Massimiliano Tancioni 
 
 
Disentangling factors 
behind training participation in Italy 
 
 2
 
 
 
 
DISENTANGLING FACTORS  
BEHIND TRAINING PARTICIPATION IN ITALY∗ 
 
 
Giuseppe Croce and Massimiliano Tancioni♣ 
 
 
Abstract. This paper analyses the pattern of training participation in Italy. Employing a 
new survey conducted on a large sample of individuals, we develop a model of bilateral 
training choices. In order to distinguish between workers and employers choices, we 
estimate a structural bivariate probit model whose identification relies on some mild 
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and firm’s characteristics. Among the most relevant results, we find that females demand 
as much training as males and suffer from poorer chances of firm-provided training. 
Similarly, employees with a temporary contract are rationed even if their demand is in 
line with that of their permanent colleagues. Conversely, the lower participation of part-
timers is explained by lower demand. A stance for more targeted training public policies 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, Government institutions assumed education and training of adults as a 
major leverage to pursue the structural adjustment of the economy as well as to improve the 
labour market prospects of individuals. In particular, workers’ training has been conceived as  
a remedy to counteract the widening gaps between skilled and unskilled persons. 
Nonetheless, further investigations are requested to support this policy strategy and to design 
proper training measures. Groups facing poor training opportunities and factors affecting 
training participation have to be carefully detected for a more effective implementation of 
targeted policies. The economic analysis should also attempt to distinguish whether 
inequalities in training participation result from efficient investments (Leuven 2005) or, on 
the contrary, imply some inefficiencies too, as the rationales for public intervention in the 
two cases are different (Snower and Booth 1996, Lynch 2003, OECD 2004, Wöβmann and 
Schütz 2006). 
As a matter of fact, the empirical evidence exhibits large differences in participation rates 
to training activities of various groups of workers. Explaining training participation has to be 
regarded as a tricky task since both workers and employers can play a role in training 
investment decisions. In other words, the observed pattern of participation derives from 
bilateral decisions and it is not easy to distinguish the factors determining the workers 
willingness to participate to training and the employers propensity to finance and sponsor it. 
Oosterbeek (1998) made clear that, because of lack of information, estimates of training 
participation mostly refer to a reduced form model, whereas a structural model would be 
requested in order to disentangle factors impinging on workers’ and employers’ choices.  
Employing the information provided by a new survey conducted on a large sample of 
individuals, in this paper we estimate a model of training choices in structural form. It is a 
well-known fact that the employers usually play a prominent role in promoting training 
activities (Bassanini et al. 2005). We are interested to inferring and evaluating the decision 
criteria they adopt to select participants to these activities. A relevant question is whether 
firms selectivity, which is assumed to reflect employers’ private return on training different 
groups of workers, also accords with the social return or, conversely, it implies some 
deviations from it. In the former case, a public intervention aimed at favouring training 
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opportunities of disadvantaged groups implies that the standard trade-off between equality 
and efficiency would arise, whereas in the latter it could bring about some reduction of 
inequality together with efficiency improvements. 
A general principle in training policy maintains that worker and employer have to sustain 
the largest part of training costs as they reap most of its benefits. Nevertheless, a number of 
market failures can justify public intervention (Booth and Snower 1996). Training policies 
usually consist of a set of measures targeted to groups of workers facing the poorest training 
chances. This would require empirical analyses to assess if low participation primarily 
depends on worker’s and/or employer’s attitudes. 
The most relevant feature of our dataset is that it provides information not only on 
training participation but also on its financing. This information must be considered 
cautiously as individuals could not perfectly perceive which subjects (employer, government 
and other public agencies, individual themselves) actually sustain the direct and indirect 
training costs and how large is their respective cost share. Moreover, the items included in 
the questionnaire to specify the source of financing only permit an approximate answer. 
However, in our analysis we do not rely on punctual information on financing as at this stage 
we merely need to distinguish between the training provided by the employer and that 
acquired by the worker from other sources.  
Accordingly, we group cases of participation to training in two categories: internal 
training, corresponding to training organised and/or financed by the employer, and external 
training, including the training financed by local and regional governments, by the European 
Social Fund, by the worker himself or free for other reasons. Furthermore, we also exploit 
additional information concerning workers who did not participate to training activities but 
declare to have applied for a course. These workers can be considered as “rationed” workers 
as they searched for training but their demand didn’t match any suitable offer. 
 
 
2. A structural model of training participation  
 
Empirical evidence across countries reveals that employers play a crucial role in 
financing and providing training opportunities to their employees. Internal training always 
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requires a joint decision by the employer and the worker. Available information usually 
reports only whether training occurred or not, without any further information allowing to 
distinguish between the worker and the employer’s behaviour. Based on this information, at 
best only reduced form models of training participation can be estimated (see for example 
Arulampalam et al. 2003). Even if factors associated to low (high) participation can be 
detected, it is not possible to establish if and how they impinge on the workers’ and/or on the 
employers’ choices.  
Few recent papers tried to overcome this limitation and to estimate structural models of 
participation. Oosterbeek (1998) firstly proposed to identify training demand by workers and 
supply by firms by exploiting the fact that in the International Adults Literacy Survey (IALS) 
respondents who did not participate to any training are asked if they would like/wanted to do 
it, so that, in case of affirmative answer, they can be considered as “rationed” workers. 
Leuven and Oosterbeek (1999), OECD (2003) and Bassanini and Ok (2004) provide further 
applications of this scheme. All these papers are based on data from IALS for the ‘90s. 
In OECD (2003) it is assumed that firms acquire training in an upstream market and, 
correspondingly, resell it to the workers in a downstream market. Then, at this second stage, 
firms supply training while workers demand it. In such a context participation to training as 
well as rationing represent training demand, whereas participation to internal training has to 
be attributed also to training supply by firms. However, such an attempt to identify training 
demand and supply requires rather strong assumptions on the position and the slope of their 
respective curves. Moreover, taking into account the distinction between internal and 
external training would add further analytical difficulties, as two distinct markets should be 
considered in principle. For these reasons we prefer to consider a slightly different scheme 
where internal training depends on the matching of the training demanded by the worker with 
that offered by the employer. We assume that such a matching occurs when the employer 
does offer some training to those demanding it and this offer fits the characteristics of 
training demanded by the worker. 
The following two equations give, respectively, the quantities of training demanded and 
offered  
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(subscript i for the i -th individual has been omitted). More precisely, wy  represents the 
training demanded by the i -th worker whereas fy  refers to the training offered by the 
employer and fitting the i -th worker’s demand. Moreover, x  is a vector of explanatory 
variables measuring observed characteristics of workers, jobs and firms, fβ  and wβ  are the 
vectors of coefficients, fα  and wα  are, respectively firm and worker’s constant terms and 
fε  and wε  are the group-specific error terms. 
We use data from the first wave of Plus, a survey conducted by ISFOL in 2005. It 
represents a new dataset which allows us to apply such an analysis to Italy for the first time.  
We assume that the firm will offer suitable training opportunities to the worker, that is 
0>fy , if and only if it is profitable for it. On the other hand, a necessary condition for the 
worker demands for training, that is 0>wy , is that he finds it convenient, which is the case 
when the benefits overpass the costs. As noted above, worker’s participation depends also on 
qualitative characteristics of the training, like the training contents and the effort requested, 
or other aspects, as the training timetable, which can conflict with non-monetary constraints.  
Even if we do not observe the quantities wy , demand can be identified through 
observations of participation. Even when no monetary fee is paid, participation can be always 
considered as a part of the training demand as it always requires some costs in terms of effort 
by the worker. Moreover, following Oosterbeek (1998) we assume that the employer is not 
able to impose training to the worker so that he accepts to take internal training only if he 
finds it convenient. Furthermore, the demand estimate can take advantage also of information 
on those individuals who did not participate but declare to have applied for a course, that we 
can consider as “rationed”. 
On the other hand, supply cannot be directly estimated as no information on costs and 
possible rationing of suppliers are available. Difficulties arise even because of the plurality of 
suppliers. Concerning internal training, we assume that the employer is able to select 
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participants by targeting explicitly the training activities to specific groups or by arranging 
the set of training characteristics upon which workers participation depends. 
Then we can define the dichotomous variables fz  and wz , where fz  takes value 1 if 
fy  is positive, meaning that the employer offers some training, and zero otherwise, and wz  
takes value 1 if 0>wy , that is when the worker demands training, and zero otherwise . 
We thus define two probit equations. In the first one, the dependent variable equals 1 if 
the worker underwent training during the three years before the interview, either inside or 
outside the firm, or if he declares himself to be rationed, and zero otherwise. According to 
our scheme, this equation should capture the effects of each variable on the probability that 
training occurs or that worker reports some rationing. This corresponds at estimating the 
vector of parameters for the explanatory variables defining the unconditional probability 
model:  
 
( )1)occur rationingor   trainingexternalor  internal( =≡ wzPP .            (2) 
 
In other words, from this probit equation we get an estimate of the vector of coefficients 
wβ  measuring how factors affect worker’s willingness to take training, that is his demand 
for training.  
On the other hand, in the second probit equation, which applies only to the sub-sample of 
trained and rationed workers (those with value 1 in the first equation) the dependent variable 
takes value 1 when internal training occurred and zero in case of external training or 
rationing. In this case we estimate the effects of our set of regressors on the conditional 
probability of internal training (conditional to the existence of workers’ demand) 
 
 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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In other terms, we are estimating the probability that the employer offers a suitable 
training to the worker, who is demanding it, so that the matching of training offer and 
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demand takes place. Though we are not able to directly estimate the coefficients vector fβ , 
representing the effects of the explanatory variables on the training supply, the comparison of 
the unconditional and conditional probability model results allows us to make some 
inferences about the employers’ willingness to train each specific group of workers. This 
represents a valuable step forward in explaining the distribution of training across different 
groups of workers. 
 
 
3. Empirical model and estimation strategy 
 
Operationally, the basic empirical formulation of our model is the bivariate probit model, 
based on the dichotomous representation in fw zz ,  of fw yy  and : 
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where [ ] [ ].0,0,1,1, normal)  (bivariate BVN~, ρεε iwif  Notice that the standard univariate 
case arises if 0=ρ , which occurrence is testable employing the Lagrange multiplier statistic 
on 0:0 =ρH . Given the approach employed here, we do not expect to find independence 
between the two equations, as they are estimated employing (partially) overlapping sample 
information.          
Differently from standard structural models, instead of imposing theory-based coefficient 
restrictions, identification is obtained  from sample selection1. In other terms, we do not 
restrict neither the variables nor the signs of the coefficients of the two equations. This is 
possible given our theoretical apparatus briefly sketched in the preceding section, which 
implies that identification can be obtained by discriminating the possible dichotomous 
outcomes on iz . 
                                                 
1 The estimator is proposed by Wynand and van Praag (1981). For an extensive application which uses sample 
selection see Boyes, Hoffman, and Low (1989). 
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In order to highlight the differences between our structural approach and the standard 
reduced-form model estimates, we start our analysis by estimating an univariate probit model 
in which the dependent variable is 1 if training occurs and 0 otherwise. Results are thus 
compared with those from the bivariate probit model (4), estimated on the same set of 
regressors.   
As in any nonlinear model, the estimated coefficients of (4) are not the parameters of 
interest, as they do not necessarily represent the marginal effects.  For this reason, we also 
calculate the marginal effects of our probit models. Since in the bivariate probit framework 
there are several definitions of the marginal effects, we will restrict our attention to those of 
theoretical interest for our scopes.  
For expositional convenience, we define a vector wf xxx ∪=  and define the starting 
bivariate probability as [ ] [ ]ρ,,1,1 '' xγxγΦ wfwwf zzP === , where fff xβxγ '' = , 'fγ  containing 
the nonzero elements of 'fβ and the zeroes corresponding to variables potentially entering in 
fx  only. wγ  is defined likewise. On the basis of our specific interest for the one or zero 
outcome, signs are changed accordingly (Greene, 2000); as an example, 
[ ] [ ].,,0,1 '' ρ−−=== xγxγΦ wfwwf zzP    
Given our sample selection, when we focus our interest on the probability model (2), our 
objective is the evaluation of the marginal effects for the probability of workers participating 
to a training programme irrespective of firms availability to sponsor it (demand). Formally, 
this corresponds to evaluating the marginal effects for the unconditional mean function 
[ ] ( )xγΦx 'wwzE = . The marginal effects for the bivariate probability model are the following: 
 
wwff
w hh γγ
x
Φ +=∂
∂           (5) 2. 
 
Notice that they are statistically equivalent to those obtainable with the univariate probability 
model only if 0=ρ . 
                                                 
2 See Greene (2000) for technical details on the definition of the scalars ( )wfh , . 
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Employing the same apparatus, we also evaluate the conditional marginal effects for the 
case [ ]11 == wf zzP  which implies of considering the marginal effects based on the 
conditional mean [ ]x,1=wf zzE , i.e. the case of interest for the probability model (3): 
 
[ ] [ ][ ] [ ][ ]xγΦ xγxγΦx xx '
'' ,,
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From (6) we obtain an evaluation of the probability of a firm sponsoring a training 
programme (supply) conditional to the participation availability (i.e. demand) of the worker. 
Conditioning on the worker’s participation availability is consistent with a worker’s veto 
option assumption.  The definition of the marginal effects in this case is given by the 
following: 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ][ ] ⎪⎭⎪⎬
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4. Sample selection and the definition of the independent variables set 
 
The Isfol PLUS survey contains information on the characteristics of 40386 individuals, 
selected according to their status of participation to the labour market (active unemployed, 
employed, pensioners). The employed group is composed by 21397 individuals, of which 
12736 (nearly 60%) are dependent workers. Given our aim of identifying training supply and 
demand, we restrict our attention to the latter subset only.  
The high variability and idiosyncrasies emerging for the younger in the Italian labour 
market suggests of selecting individuals aged 20 or more only, which leads to a further 
sample reduction (12446 dependent workers). Moreover, since in the survey questionnaire 
the individuals are asked to answer on the basis of a three years training participation record, 
we further restrict our sample to those declaring an employment status persisting for three 
years or more. This guarantees that the sample, other things equal, is balanced in terms of 
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training opportunities of the representative worker. Given the last restriction, the final sample 
is composed of 12050 individuals, which we define “operational”. 
After having imposed our sample selection strategy discussed in section 2 to the 
operational sample, we end up with the following data structure: 
 
i) 3205 individuals (26.3% of the operational sample) participating to an internal 
training programme; 
ii) 5939 individuals (49.3% of the operational sample) participating to an 
internal/external training programme; 
iii) 6130 individuals (50.9% of the operational sample) being trained (internally or 
externally) or not being trained even having declared to have applied for a 
training course; 
iv) 191 (1,6%) are those who have not participated to a training programme even 
having applied for a training course. 
 
Concerning the definition of the independent variables set, we select a very general set in 
which individual, job-specific and firm’s characteristics are considered. Our set consists 
of  twelve variables, of which three are continuous and nine dichotomous.  
The continuous variables are: 
  
1) age of the employee (age); 
2) seniority, i.e. the number of years of work within the present-time job 
contract/firm (sen); 
3) size of the firm in which the individual works, defined in terms of dependent 
workers in the firm (f_size). 
 
The dichotomous variables are: 
 
1) sex of the employee (f, being m the control variable); 
2) the employee is the head of the family (head); 
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3) presence of family members economically depending from the employee 
(members); 
4) regional area of residence of the employee (nw, ne, south, being center the 
control variable); 
5) level of education of the employee (edu1, edu3, edu4, edu5, being edu2 the 
control variable. See appendix for levels definitions); 
6) economic sector to which the firm belongs to. We consider 12 sectors: 
agriculture (agric), manufacturing (manuf), public utilities (publ_ut), 
constructions (constr), trade (trade), transports and commerce (tr_comm), 
financial (fin), government (gov), educational (edu), health (health), other 
services (oth_serv), being electricity (electr) the control variable; 
7) duration of the job contract, temporary or permanent (temp_c, being perm_c 
the control variable); 
8) part-time worker (p_time), being full-time (f_time) the control variable; 
9) job position, defined in five levels from high to low (pos_h, pos_mh, pos_ml, 
pos_l, being pos_m the control variable). 
 
The continuous variables are entered both linearly and squared in order to take into 
account possible nonlinearities among the dependent variable and the specific regressor. 
Thus, the actual number of continuous variables is six.  
Given the level of aggregation considered for the dichotomous variables and considering 
those omitted for normalisations, the actual number of dichotomous variables is 28.  
The total number of independent variables, once the constant term has been introduced in 
the explanatory variables space, is thus 35. Table 1 gives a means-based sample 
description for the set of regressors employed in the starting specification, distinguishing 
between demand  and  matching and the respective dichotomous outcomes (0 and 1). 
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5. Estimation results 
 
Estimation results are summarized in Table 2, which illustrates the marginal effects of 
the explanatory variables. The first column reports the results obtained from the estimation of 
the univariate model. The second column illustrates the marginal effects on the probability 
that workers demand any training, and the third one those on the probability that internal 
training occurs conditional to the workers’ demand. Below the table the number of 
observations, the log-Likelihood value and the LR test results for the hypothesis of off-
diagonal zero error correlation are reported. The LR test for zero off-diagonal correlation 
rejects the null hypothesis, indicating that the bivariate probit is the appropriate model. 
 The results of the univariate model (first column) illustrate the marginal effects of 
regressors on the probability that training occurs. According to them, training is a less 
frequent event for women than for men. Less educated workers face a lower probability of 
training. Participation increases with firm size and, contrary to what is expected, also with 
age. Moreover, it decreases in case of temporary contract and part-time employment.  
The estimate of the bivariate model makes somewhat clearer the causal relationships 
underlying such findings. Indeed, it helps us to distinguish whether the observed distribution 
of training among different groups has to be attributed mainly to the workers’ or to the 
employers’ choices, or both. For example, we find that the training gap suffered by 
temporary employees mainly depends on employers’ unwillingness to train them whereas 
that of part-timers can be attributed also to weak training propensity of workers. 
By comparing different groups of workers it is possible to analyse the distribution of 
training among them. It is a well known fact that training participation is unevenly 
distributed among different groups and that this could represent a disadvantage for those with 
less frequent participation as they fail to accumulate skills during their working life. What is 
less clear, is whether such inequalities of the training distribution imply also some 
inefficiencies from a social point of view. In this case, low participation rates depend on 
insufficient investments, meaning that some net benefits that could arise from further 
investments are lost. 
As employers play a crucial role in promoting skills acquisition of the employed 
population, we focus our analysis on the distribution of internal training. In particular, if a 
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group of workers has a high probability of demanding training but faces a low probability of 
taking internal training, it could be reasonable to regard such situation as inefficient. High 
demand reveals that training represents a valuable activity for the workers. Then, low 
participation to internal training likely depends on the employers’ choices. More precisely, 
this group does not receive enough training offers from the employers, or it finds these offers 
unsuitable with regard to the balance of benefits and costs or, finally, the characteristics of 
the offered training do not match with the preferences and the constraints of the workers. 
The theoretical literature suggests various explanations of the fact that the employer does 
not offer much training to a specific group of workers (Bassanini et al. 2005). This is what 
happens when the gap between productivity and wage stays constant or decreases instead of 
increasing when skills are accumulated, meaning that wage gains following skills acquisition 
are larger than productivity gains leaving the employer without incentives to invest. 
Employers are also reluctant to train those groups of employees with a higher probability of 
quitting the firm towards inactivity or other firms. Older workers are likely to receive less 
training as the remaining duration of their career could be too short to recoup the costs. 
Another reason can derive from complementarities between education and training. If the 
amount of previously acquired human capital strengthens the beneficial effect of the present 
training, then the employers will find more profitable to train the high educated than those 
with low education. Furthermore, the employers can suffer from informational asymmetry 
about unobservable characteristics of individual workers affecting training outcomes. Then it 
is likely that employers avoid to offer training to newly hired and postpone it until they can 
select carefully the participants. In this case we should observe that training participation 
increases with tenure, at least within a certain threshold. Finally, discriminations and other 
cultural factors can condition the criteria of selection adopted by the employers. 
In some of these cases, if employers do not offer enough training to their workforce, an 
underinvestment could arise (Leuven 2005). This is the case, for example, when positive 
externality deriving from labour mobility (poaching) depresses the employer’s incentives 
without increasing the worker’s ones. The same happens when workers could reap most of 
the benefits from training but are unable to invest because of a liquidity constraint. Even time 
constraints can prevent workers who do not receive internal training from participating to 
external courses in leisure time. Underinvestment is more likely also if internal and external 
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training are not perfect substitutes as the internal one blends general and specific elements. In 
this case workers who do not receive enough training by the employer are left with poor 
chances of acquiring the same bundle of skills outside. 
Training policies – as subsidised courses or training vouchers – targeted to specific 
groups can try to increase their training participation. In a situation of underinvestment public 
interventions aim at reducing inequality of training distribution at the same time that they 
improve its efficiency. In the other cases, training can be seen as a measure to help 
disadvantaged groups but a more standard trade-off between equality and efficiency likely 
arises. 
Most of our explanatory variables result to be significant. The marginal effects derived 
from the bivariate model suggest that females demand as much training as it is demanded by 
males. Nevertheless they suffer from poorer chances of training inside the firms. As we 
control for the kind of contract, industrial dummies, and other variables traditionally 
associated to women disadvantage, it can be argued that lesser internal training of women 
can be attributed to employers’ reluctance to train them. In its turn, this can depend on higher 
turnover or on discrimination. This finding confirms previous studies reporting that females 
demand tends to be similar to that of their male peers but it is constrained by a shortage of 
training supply3.  
As expected, training demand steeply increases with the worker’s educational level (edu) 
while, more surprisingly, no similar effects of education on the internal training are 
noticeable. Training demand by graduate workers (edu4) is some 30% more frequent than 
that from the edu2 group. This evidence can be explained by the presence of 
complementarities between education and further training, which represents a widely 
accepted fact (Brunello 2001, Arulampalam et al. 2003), and supports the idea that “learning 
begets learning” (Heckman 2000). Nevertheless the figures in the third column show that 
highly educated workers, who can reap the largest benefits from training, do not find 
adequate opportunities in their firms. The probability of participation to employer-provided 
                                                 
3 Similar outcomes are reported by Oosterbeek and Leuven (1999), who estimated a tobit model with censoring, 
whit the dependent variable representing the quantity of training, in their study conducted on IALS data for 
Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland and United States in the mid-90’s; by OECD (2003), based on the same 
dataset related to a larger number of advanced countries and by Bassanini et al. (2005) on ECHP data on 
European countries for the period 1995-2001. On the contrary, Arulampalam et al. (2003), estimate for Italy a 
greater probability of training for women. 
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training seems to be unaffected by educational levels and tends to be higher for the 
intermediate level. These findings suggest that the low participation of the less educated 
reflects weak training propensity on the workers’ side rather than scarcity of employers-
provided chances. 
Explanations of this fact can rely both on the benefits and costs elements. On the one 
hand, one can argue that occupational needs of Italian enterprises are concentrated on low 
and intermediate positions, because of the relative scarcity of innovative activities in the 
economy. However, explanations cannot rely only on national factors as similar results are 
obtained also for other countries (see Oosterbeek and Leuven 1999, OECD 2003 and 
Bassanini et al. 2005). On the other hand, it can also be presumed that firms cannot afford to 
provide inside training for high skilled as this would imply sophisticated and costly 
requirements. For this reason external training tends to substitute the internal one, and the 
role of employers becomes less prominent.  
In short, these findings suggest that the low educated do not suffer from a shortage of 
training chances due to employers’ selectivity. On the contrary, low participation depends on 
workers’ weaker preference for it. Then, training policies should be addressed to workers 
rather than to firms. Nevertheless, other measures, like adults education and active labour 
policies could be more effective than training policy to help people with very low education. 
Both workers’ demand and internal training probability rise with respect to age, although 
the estimates of squared age, negative and significant, reveal that its effect tends to decrease. 
At first, this finding is not consistent with human capital theory which predicts that younger 
individuals are more likely to take training. It can be argued that the higher turnover 
experienced by young workers discourage employers from offering training to them. At the 
same time, even workers tend to postpone investments given initial employment instability. 
Evidence from earlier studies appears somewhat mixed to this regard. In Bassanini et al. 
(2005) the age-training profile results to be downward-sloped. Also Oosterbeek and Leuven 
(1999) find a negative effect of age on the workers’ demand. OECD (2003), on the other 
hand, reports an increasing effect of age on employer’s offer of training while Arulampalam 
et al. (2003) find that Italy is the only country where age does not affect training probability.   
Training participation increases with seniority (sen), that is the number of years of 
employment with the present-time employer. This effect parallels that of age. At the initial 
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stage of the relationship uncertainty about the quality of the matching and the expected 
duration of it make the workers and employers less eager to invest in skills acquirement. 
Afterwards, their investment propensity increases as the relationship proves satisfactory and 
the employment prospects become less volatile. 
Even the employment contract affects training investments. Employees with a 
temporary contract (temp_c) demand as much training as their permanent colleagues but, 
conversely, they are short of training chances inside the firm. More precisely, their 
probabilities are reduced by 8,5% with respect to the permanent workers4. The bivariate 
model reveals that temporary workers do not enjoy enough employer-sponsored training 
even if this could be beneficial to them. Firms choices, in this case, are negatively affected by 
poor prospects of recuperating the training cost, due to the shorter expected duration of 
employment. For this reason the socially efficient result appears to be far from being 
attained. Temporary employment seems to imply not only inequality in training participation 
but also a loss of efficiency. Following this result, policy measures could be addressed to 
temporary workers in order to increase their opportunities of training outside the firm. A 
voucher program which entitles them to expend a certain amount of money on participating 
to a course could represent a proper measure in this case (which should be complemented by 
provision of information and counselling to the individuals in order to help them to choose 
the right training offer).  
Different implications derive from part-time (p_time) employment. Part-timers exhibit a 
lower training demand with respect to those working full-time in addition to a lesser 
participation to internal training (this result is close to that provided by Bassanini et al. 2005). 
Lower demand likely depends on the same factors preventing these employees from working 
full time5. Even in this case the results from the bivariate model prove to be more 
informative than those from the univariate one. They suggest that low training participation 
of part-timers depends on workers’ demand more than on employers’ selectivity. Then, the 
                                                 
4 In Arulampalam et al. (2003) training probability for Italian workers results to be unaffected by the duration of 
the contract. 
5 This hypothesis should be further verified by distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary part-timers. 
Indeed, OECD (2003) reports that involuntary part-timers prefer training as much as workers with full-time 
contract do. 
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hypothesis of underinvestment can be excluded in this case while it was accepted for 
temporary workers. 
As far as regional areas are concerned, Northwest and Northeast – which are confronted 
to the Centre in our specification – display a different pattern. In both regions internal 
training is a more frequent event than in other areas. However, workers’ demand in Northeast 
results to be stronger than anywhere. Tentative explanations can point to structural 
differences between regional labour markets with respect to labour mobility and wage 
structure. A fiercer mobility and a less compressed wage structure in the Northeast , with a 
higher share of small and medium firms in the economy (Trivellato et al. 2005), partly shift 
the incentive to invest in training from the employers to the workers. Besides this, more 
advanced technological and organisational characteristics as well as union influence and 
managerial culture, not fully captured by firm size and industrial dummies, can also 
contribute to explain the higher probability of internal training in all the Northern regions.  
The occupational position (pos) strongly influences workers’ willingness to take training 
as demand increases with the rank of the job. The probability that workers in high level 
(managers, professionals and highly specialised technicians) and in medium-high level 
(teachers and other technicians) occupations demand training is 10%-13% higher than in case 
of workers in medium level occupations (the reference group, comprising clerks and 
specialised workmen). On the other hand, the same probability decrease by 13-16% for those 
in medium-low level (call center operators, service, shop assistants, craftsmen, plant and 
machine operators and generic workmen) and in low level occupations (elementary 
occupations). On the other hand, our results indicate that the employers’ investments favour 
only clerks and specialised workmen. Workers in higher occupational levels have to resort to 
external training given the shortage of training opportunities for them inside the firms.  
These findings parallel the effect of education discussed above. Higher hierarchical 
positions in large and medium enterprises require sophisticated knowledge, which workers 
more often acquire by themselves. In addition, higher positions in small firms are mainly 
characterised by tacit knowledge, which is accumulated through experience and informal 
relationships rather than formal courses. In both cases internal training does not play a 
primary role. 
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Training probabilities are affected also by the firm size. Both its effects on the worker 
demand and on internal training are positive and significant. However, the inclusion of the 
squared size reveals some non-linearity in the size-training profile.  
Finally, the employees in public utilities, transport and communications, finance, 
government, education, health and other services, demand training more frequently than their 
peers in electricity, which represents the benchmark industry. Nevertheless, it is only in 
transport and communication and in the financial sector that they do receive more training, 
while those employed in tourism and education participate less.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The observed pattern of participation to training derives from bilateral decisions by the 
workers and the employers and it is not easy to distinguish the factors determining the 
workers willingness to receive training and the employers propensity to finance it. Because 
of lack of information, estimates of training participation usually refer to a reduced form 
model, whereas a structural model would be requested in order to disentangle factors 
impinging on workers’ and employers’ choices. Employing the information provided by a 
new survey conducted on a large sample of individuals, the paper provided an estimate of a 
model of the training choice in its structural form. This represents a valuable step forward in 
explaining the distribution of training across different groups of workers. 
A bivariate probit model with a very general specification of the regressors space has 
been estimated. We also presents the standard univariate model on the same set of regressors. 
Our findings suggest that employers are reluctant to train women and temporary workers, 
though they would like to receive as much training as their peers do. Highly educated 
workers, whose training can yield the largest benefits, are prone to acquire it outside the firm 
as they do not find adequate opportunities inside. At the same time, the low level of training 
participation of the less educated seems to depend on workers’ weaker preference rather than 
on employers’ selectivity. Contrary to the prediction of the human capital theory, the age-
training profile is proved to be upward-sloped. Indeed, both the demand and the supply of 
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training increase with age. Part-time workers exhibit a lower demand respect to those 
working full-time.  
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Table 2: Estimation results from the univariate and bivariate probit models   
Note: Likelihood ratio test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 4446.23, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; when 
dummy variables are considered, dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable 
from 0 to 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Regressor dy/dx z-stat dy/dx z-stat dy/dx z-stat
age 0,012 3,01 0,011 2,88 0,014 3,58
age_sq 0,000 -4,32 0,000 -4,11 0,000 -3,15
f -0,021 -1,57 -0,012 -0,89 -0,035 -2,67
head -0,014 -1,08 -0,006 -0,49 -0,006 -0,45
members 0,003 0,73 0,004 0,99 0,001 0,19
nw 0,008 0,56 0,014 0,92 0,034 2,3
ne 0,080 5,21 0,075 5,06 0,037 2,47
south 0,004 0,26 -0,005 -0,33 0,008 0,61
edu_1 -0,143 -3,49 -0,145 -3,59 -0,017 -0,41
edu_3 0,187 12,51 0,194 13,23 0,039 2,69
edu_4 0,310 17,84 0,299 17,67 -0,005 -0,32
edu_5 0,413 14,6 0,404 15,04 -0,032 -1,17
f_size 0,000 3,97 0,000 4,34 0,000 3,18
f_size_sq 0,000 -2,71 0,000 -2,9 0,000 -2,73
agric -0,012 -0,19 0,015 0,25 -0,065 -1,09
manuf 0,003 0,06 0,007 0,15 0,059 1,3
pub_ut 0,069 1,24 0,090 1,66 0,057 1,06
constr 0,017 0,31 0,020 0,38 0,010 0,19
trade 0,051 1,1 0,051 1,11 0,016 0,35
tour 0,035 0,66 0,043 0,84 -0,091 -1,77
tr_comm 0,138 2,93 0,159 3,54 0,089 1,99
fin 0,203 4,4 0,217 4,93 0,194 4,42
gov 0,278 6,67 0,288 7,17 0,059 1,47
edu 0,213 4,8 0,220 5,1 -0,079 -1,83
health 0,308 7,69 0,305 7,9 -0,015 -0,39
oth_serv 0,083 1,77 0,091 2 -0,002 -0,04
temp_c -0,014 -0,81 0,001 0,04 -0,085 -5,20
p_time -0,109 -7,11 -0,114 -7,61 -0,062 -4,13
pos_h 0,102 4,65 0,100 4,61 -0,112 -5,18
pos_mh 0,129 8,12 0,130 8,22 -0,025 -1,61
pos_ml -0,163 -10,46 -0,157 -10,07 -0,078 -5,02
pos_l -0,137 -4,89 -0,133 -4,86 -0,078 -2,85
sen 0,013 5,73 0,013 6,05 0,010 4,89
sen_sq 0,000 -3,6 0,000 -3,98 0,000 -3,91
Univariate probit Bivariate probit
P(zw=1, zf=0,1) P(zf=1 | zw=1)
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